CS251 Fall 2022

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Scaling the blockchain part II: Rollups

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Scaling the blockchain: the problem

Transaction rates (Tx/sec):

```
    Bitcoin: can process about 7 (Tx/sec)
        Tx Fees fluctuate:
        2$ to 60$ for simple Tx

    Ethereum: can process about 15 (Tx/sec)
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The visa network: can process up to 24,000 (Tx/sec)

Can we scale blockchains to visa speeds? ... with low Tx fees

How to process more Tx per second

Many ideas:


Use a faster consensus protocol

reduces composability

- Parallelize: split the chain into independent shards
- Today: Rollups, move the work somewhere else
- Payment channels: reduce the need to touch the chain
 - Requires locking up funds; mostly designed for payments.

Recall: a basic layer-1 blockchain

Can handle 15 Tx/sec ...



A layer-1 blockchain (e.g., Ethereum)

current world state updated world state updated world state

World state: balances, storage, etc.

Rollup idea 1: batch many Tx into one

A layer-1 blockchain updated Rollup state root, and Tx list (e.g., Ethereum) Rollup current world state coordinator (Rollup state Merkle root) Tx_R (Tx list) TXC updated world state Rollup state: (updated Rollup state root) Alice's balance Bob's balance

Rollup idea 1: batch many Tx into one

Key point:

Hundreds of transactions
 on Rollup state are batched into
 a single transaction on layer-1


 \Rightarrow 100x speed up in Tx/sec

Let's see how ...

Rollup state: Alice's balance Bob's balance ... A layer-1 blockchain (e.g., Ethereum)

current world state (Rollup state Merkle root) (Tx list) updated world state (updated Rollup state root)


Rollup operation (simplified)



Layer 1 blockchain (e.g. Ethereum)

block 354

Rollup operation (simplified)



In more detail

Rollup contract on layer-1 holds assets of all Rollup accounts (and Merkle state root)

Alice:
Bob:
3 ETH, 2 DAI

Rollup state (L2)

Alice: Bob: Uniswap: Rollup contract: ... state state 7 ETH, 3 DAI, root

Layer-1 blockchain (L1)

(coordinator stores state)

Transfers inside Rollup are easy (L2 → L2)

Rollup state (L2)



[A \rightarrow B: 2 ETH], sig_A (with hundreds of Tx)

Alice: Bob: ... 4 ETH, 1 DAI 3 ETH, 2 DAI ...

Alice: Bob: Uniswap: Rollup contract: ... state state 7 ETH, 3 DAI, root ...

Transfers inside Rollup are easy (L2 → L2)

Coordinator updates root on Rollup contract

Rollup state (L2)



[A \rightarrow B: 2 ETH], sig_A (with hundreds of Tx)

Alice: Bob: ... 5 ETH, 2 DAI ...

new Merkle root,

Tx list

Alice: state

Bob: state

Uniswap:

state

Rollup contract:


7 ETH, 3 DAI, root

•••

Transferring funds into Rollup (L1 → L2)

Alice issues an L1 Tx: slow and expensive

Rollup state (L2)



Alice:

2 ETH, 1 DAI

Bob:

5 ETH, 2 DAI

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
Alice: Bob: Uniswap: Rollup contract: ... 7 ETH, 3 DAI, root

Layer-1 blockchain (L1)

Transferring funds into Rollup (L1 → L2)

Alice issues an L1 Tx: slow and expensive

Rollup state (L2)



Alice: **4 ETH**, 1 DAI

Bob:

5 ETH, 2 DAI

new Merkle root,

Tx list

Alice: state

Bob: state

Uniswap:

state

Rollup contract:

9 ETH, 3 DAI, root

2 ETH

Transferring funds out of Rollup (L2 → L1)

Requires extra gas on L1 to process transfer

Rollup state



[withdraw 4 ETH], sig_A

(plus hundreds of Tx)

Alice:

4 ETH, 1 DAI

Bob:

5 ETH, 2 DAI

•••

Alice: Bob: Uniswap: Rollup contract: ...
state state 9 ETH, 3 DAI, root ...

Transferring funds out of Rollup (L2 → L1)

Requires extra gas on L1 to process transfer

Rollup state



[withdraw 4 ETH], sig_A (plus hundreds of Tx)

Alice:

0 ETH, 1 DAI

Bob:

5 ETH, 2 DAI

new Merkle root,

Tx list

Alice: state

Bob: state

Uniswap:

state

Rollup contract:

5 ETH, 3 DAI, root

4 ETH

Summary: transferring Rollup assets

Transactions within a Rollup are easy:

Batch settlement on L1 network (e.g., Ethereum)

Moving funds into or out of Rollup system (L1 \Leftrightarrow L2) is expensive:


• Requires posting more data on L1 network \implies higher Tx fees.

Moving funds from one Rollup system to another (L2 \Leftrightarrow L2)

Running contracts on a Rollup?

Two copies of Uniswap

Rollup state (L2)



⇒ Rollup users can cheaply interact with Uniswap on Rollup

Alice:	Bob:	Uniswap:	Rollup contract:	•••
state	state	state	7 ETH, 3 DAI, root	

Running contracts on a Rollup?

Rollup state (L2)

Uniswap: Alice: Bob: ... state 4 ETH, 1 DAI 3 ETH, 2 DAI ...

Coordinator maintains state of all contracts on Rollup system:

- It updates the Uniswap Merkle leaf after every Tx to Uniswap
- Writes updated Rollup state Merkle root to L1 chain

Running contracts on a Rollup?

Rollup state (L2)

Uniswap: state

Alice:

4 ETH, 1 DAI

Bob:

3 ETH, 2 DAI

•••


Rollup functions as Ethereum, but w/o a consensus protocol!!

It relies on the L1 chain to attest to the current Rollup state

How to send Tx to the coordinator

Enduser configures its wallet to send Tx to the RPC points of the selected Rollup.

(by default Metamask sends Tx to the Ethereum Mainnet RPC points)



Not so simple ...

Problems ...

Problem 1: what if coordinator is dishonest?

- It could steal funds from the Rollup contract
- It could issue fake Tx on behalf of users

Problem 2: what if coordinator stops providing service?

 If Rollup state is lost, how can we initialize a new coordinator?

Problem 1: what if coordinator is dishonest?

Can coordinator steal funds from Rollup users?

No! L1 chain verifies that Rollup state updates are valid.


⇒ <u>all</u> Tx are valid and properly signed by the Rollup users

Challenge: how to do this cheaply ?? (with little gas on L1)

Alice: Bob: Rollup contract: ... **7 ETH, 3 DAI,** root ...

Verifying Rollup state updates

Approach 1: validity proofs (called a zk-Rollup)



What the SNARK proof proves

SNARK proof is **short** and **fast** to verify:

⇒ Cheap to verify proof on the slow L1 chain (with EVM support) (usually not a zero knowledge proof)

Public statement: (old state root, new state root, Tx list)

Witness: (state of each touched account pre- and post- batch,

Merkle proofs for touched accounts, user sigs)

SNARK proof proves that:

- (1) all user sigs on Tx are valid, (2) all Merkle proofs are valid,
- (3) post-state is the result of applying Tx list to pre-state


zkEVM

When a contract (e.g. Uniswap) runs on a Rollup:

- coordinator builds a SNARK proof of correct execution of an EVM program ⇒ called a zkEVM
- Generating proof is a heavyweight computation
 ... verifying proof is fast

Two flavors of zkEVM:

- Prove that EVM bytecode ran correctly (Polygon zkEVM, Scroll)
- Compile Solidity to a SNARK-friendly circuit (MatterLabs)



(lots of GPUs)

The end result

Rollup contract on L1 ensures coordinator cannot cheat:

- all submitted Tx must have been properly signed by users
- all state updates are valid

- ⇒ Rollup contract on L1 will accept any update with a valid proof
- ⇒ Anyone can act as a coordinator (with enough compute power)

Verifying Rollup state updates

Approach 2: fraud proofs (called an optimistic Rollup)

- Coordinator deposits stake in escrow on L1 Rollup contract
- Operation: Coordinator submits state updates to L1 w/o a proof
- If update is invalid: anyone has seven days to submit a fraud proof
 - Successful fraud proof means coordinator gets slashed on L1
 - Unsuccessful fraud proof costs complainer a fee

Challenge: how to prove fraud to Rollup contract on L1??

Naively: L1 can re-execute all Tx in batch \Rightarrow expensive and slow

Fraud Proof game



claimed

pre-root

Tx list



post-root

Coordinator computes Merkle tree of all states. Sends Merkle root to L1

different post-root

prestate



poststate

Fraud Proof game



claimed $state_n$

pre-root

Tx list

we know $state_n \neq state'_n$

fraud claim

different $state'_n$

Merkle root

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]} \quad hash_{[n/2\rightarrow n]}$

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/4]} \qquad hash_{[n/4\rightarrow n/2]}$



claimed $state_n$

pre-root

Tx list

Suppose $state_{n/2} \neq state'_{n/2}$

Merkle root

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]}$ $hash_{[n/2\rightarrow n]}$

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/4]} \qquad hash_{[n/4\rightarrow n/2]}$



different $state'_n$

 $state_0$

 $state_{n/2}$

 $state_n$



claimed $state_n$

pre-root

Tx list

Suppose $state_{n/2} \neq state'_{n/2}$

Merkle root

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]}$ $hash_{[n/2\rightarrow n]}$

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/4]} \qquad hash_{[n/4\rightarrow n/2]}$



different $state'_n$



 $state_0$

 $state_{n/2}$

Coordinator sends $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]}$ to L1 Alice sends "left" to L1



claimed $state_n$

pre-root

Tx list

Suppose $state_{n/4} = state'_{n/4}$

Merkle root

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]}$ $hash_{[n/2\rightarrow n]}$

hash_[n/4→n/2] hash_[0→n/4]



fraud claim

different $state'_n$

 $state_{n/4}$ $state_0$

 $state_{n/2}$

Coordinator sends hash $[n/4 \rightarrow n/2]$ to L1 Alice sends "right" to L1



claimed $state_n$

pre-root

Tx list

Suppose $state_{n/4} = state'_{n/4}$

Merkle root

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/2]}$ $hash_{[n/2\rightarrow n]}$

 $hash_{[0\rightarrow n/4]}$ $hash_{[n/4\rightarrow n/2]}$



madu Claim

different $state'_n$



 $state_{n/4}$

 $state_{n/2}$

Coordinator sends hash $[n/4 \rightarrow n/2]$ to L1 Alice sends "right" to L1



pre-root

Tx list



After $\log_2 n$ rounds:

- L1 has $state_i$ and $state_{i+1}$ from coordinator
- $state_i = state'_i$ and $state_{i+1} \neq state'_{i+1}$

or game times out because one player defects

⇒ Now L1 can verify fraud proof by checking **one** computation step!

Some difficulties

- (1) Transactions only settle after 7 days (after fraud window expires)
- Alice needs to wait 7 days to withdraw funds from Rollup (Rollup contract will only send her the funds after 7 days)

For fungible tokens, a 3rd party can advance the funds to Alice after checking validity of Alice's withdraw Tx. Does not apply to non-fungible tokens.

(2) Suppose a successful fraud proof 4 days after batch is posted⇒ all subsequent Tx need to be resubmitted

The end result

Can easily port any smart contract to an optimistic Rollup

• The Rollup EVM can be enhanced with new features (opcodes)

High Tx throughput: in principle, up to 4000 tx/s

No need for special hardware at the coordinator

Anyone can act as a coordinator and a verifier

Downside: 7 day finality delay

An example (StarkNet -- using validity proofs)

Block				
Number ① 🔻	Hash ①	Status ① 🔻	Num. of Txs (i)	Age ① ▼ ▼
PENDING	PENDING	PENDING	64	3min
13011	0×04322380	ACCEPTED_ON_L2	82	8min
13010	0x0492f0d1 ☐	ACCEPTED_ON_L2	122	15min
13009	0x0081…b7af ☐	ACCEPTED_ON_L2	127	24min
		•••		
12868	0x060c15eb ᠿ	ACCEPTED_ON_L2	58	8h
12867	0x06543b0f ₾	ACCEPTED_ON_L1	72	9h
12866	0x077957d6 ᠿ	ACCEPTED_ON_L1	63	9h
12865	0x06ae943f 🖸	ACCEPTED_ON_L1	97	9h

Tx posted on L1 (Ethereum) about every eight hours

Source: starkscan.co

An example (Optimism -- using fraud proofs)

Txn Batch	Age	Batch Size	L1 Txn Hash
328411	2 mins ago	109	0xbb358889959cf83413 ☑
328410	2 mins ago	91	0x8398475c9b7179ebfe ፫
328409	3 mins ago	85	0x3264a772e220beca85 [27
328408	3 mins ago	106	0xa92bd044f7576a87c1 [건
328407	4 mins ago	101	0x302cda229ed83d570e [27
328406	4 mins ago	79	0x0f205018c4a289af9d7 [27
328405	5 mins ago	113	0xedbe2e0706cb06c3cb [27
328404	5 mins ago	120	0xffaa82d2f006f519a892 [2]

Shows batch posted on L1 (Ethereum)

Source: optimistic.etherscan.io

... ok, so coordinator cannot submit invalid Tx.

Problem 2: What if coordinator stops providing service?

Solution: setup a new coordinator


... but need the latest Rollup state

Where to get state?? The data availability problem

Ensuring Rollup state is always available

The definition of a Rollup:

Rollup state can always be reconstructed from data on the L1 chain



Ensuring Rollup state is always available

To reconstruct current Rollup state:

- Read all Rollup update messages and re-execute Tx.
 - ⇒ anyone can become a coordinator
- Rollups use L1 for data storage

What to store?

- For zk-Rollup: send Tx summary to L1, without user signatures (SNARK proof proves validity of signatures)
- For optimistic: need to send Tx summary *and* signatures to L1

Ensuring Rollup state is always available

The downside: expensive

Tx list is sent as calldata: 16 gas per non-zero byte
 (EIP-4488 aims to support Rollups by reducing to 3 gas/byte)

In practice:

- Optimistic Rollups fee/Tx: 3-8 times lower than Ethereum L1
- zk-Rollup fee/Tx: 40-100 times lower than Ethereum L1

Can we do even better?

Data Availability Committee (DAC)

To further reduce Tx fees:

- Store L2 state root (small) on the L1 chain
- Store Tx data (large) with a Data Availability Committee (DAC):
 - comprises a set of nodes trusted to keep the data available
 - cheaper than storage on L1
 - L1 accepts an update only if all DAC members sign it
 - ⇒ ensures that all DAC members accepted Tx data

Setting up a new coordinator depends on availability of the DAC

Validium

Validium: an L2 using a DAC and validity proofs (SNARKS)

- Well suited for lower value assets.
- Potential privacy benefits ... only DAC members see Tx data

An example: StarkEx uses a **five** member DAC

Users can choose between Validium or Rollup modes

(Tx data off-L1-chain vs. Tx data on-L1-chain)

cheaper Tx fees, More expensive Tx, but only secure as DAC but same as L1 security

Summary: types of L2

Scaling the blockchain: Payment channels and Rollups (L2 scaling)

security—		SNARK validity proofs	Fraud proofs
availability	Tx data on L1 chain	zkRollup	optimistic Rollup, 7 day finality
	Tx data in a DAC	Validium (reduced fees, but higher risk)	"Plasma"

Volume of some L2 systems

<u>Tx Vol</u>	ume/day a	average fee/tx	(on Nov. 15, 2022)
• Ethereum: 10	13K Tx	2.71 USD/Tx	
• Arbitrum: 34	15K Tx	0.08 USD/Tx	(optimistic Rollup)
• Optimism: 30	D3K Tx	0.13 USD/Tx	(optimistic Rollup)
• StarkNet:	14K Tx	0.22 USD/Tx	(zkRollup)

Can coordinator censor a Tx?

What if coordinators refuse to process a Tx?

What to do? One option:

- enduser can post Tx directly to the L1 Rollup contract
- The L1 Rollup contract will then refuse to accept updates until an update includes that Tx
 - ⇒ censorship will cause the entire Rollup to freeze

SNARK recursion

Layer 3 and beyond ...

SNARK recursion


Two level recursion: proving knowledge of a proof

Use $V'(vp', x, \pi')$ to verify final proof π' witness: w proves P knows w s.t. C(x, w) = 0 $V(vp, x, \pi) = yes$ SNARK prover P prover P' prover P' π'

(S', P', V')

(S, P, V)

Application 1: proof compression



Application 2: Layer three and beyond

Alice: Bob: ... state ...

L3 Rollup state (any VM)

L2 Rollup state

L3 Rollup contract: state root

Alice:

2 ETH, 1 DAI

Bob:

5 ETH, 2 DAI

•••

Alice: Uniswap: state

Rollup contract:

7 ETH, 3 DAI, root

Layer-1 blockchain (L1)

Layer three and beyond

One L2 coordinator can support many L3s

- each L3 can run a custom VM with its own features
- L3 chains can communicate with each other through L2

Each L3 coordinator submits Tx list and SNARK proof to L2

- L2 coordinator: collects batch of proofs,
 - builds a proof π that it has a batch of valid proofs, and
 - submits the single proof π and updated root to L1 chain.
- \Rightarrow Scaling factor 100 \times 100

END OF LECTURE

Next lecture: more applications