

CS251 Fall 2021
(cs251.stanford.edu)



Privacy, Mixers and Monero

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Privacy for Cryptocurrencies

What information might a user want to hide?

Identity (anonymity):

- Who they are
- Who they pay
- Who pays them

Metadata:

- Script Sig, e.g multisig threshold
- Smart contract

Amounts:

- How much they are paying
- How much are they receiving
- E.g. salary

Anonymity

Weak Anonymity (Pseudonymity):

One consistent Pseudonym (e.g. reddit)

Pros: Reputation

Cons: Linkable posts, one post linked to you->
all posts linked to you


Writing style, topics of interest may link you



reddit

Strong Anonymity:

Cons: No Reputation



4chan

Who needs privacy for payments

Companies:


- Ford does not want to reveal cost of tires
- Salaries of employees
- Investment funds want to keep strategies private



Who needs privacy for payments

Consumers

- Salary, Rent, Purchasing things online, Donations



Who needs privacy for payments

Criminals:

- Stolen funds (WannaCry), buying/selling drugs, tax evasion




**Silk
Road**
anonymous marketplace

Who needs privacy for payments

Applications:

- Privacy can prevent frontrunning
- Exchanges may want to keep orderbook private
- Sealed bid auction



Privacy of Digital Payments

Payments publicly visible/linkable



Payments only visible to bank/venmo. Optionally sender/receiver public



Unlinkable private payments



Less private

More private

Privacy in Ethereum

Overview **State** Comments

Advanced A set of information that represents the current **state** is updated when a transaction takes place on the network. The below is a summary of those changes :

| Address | Before | After | State Difference |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 1.006422560609006967 Eth | 7.876422560609006967 Eth | ▲ 6.87 |
| 0x3c79295ceaac223fe... | 6.875943148 Eth | 0.004326148 Eth | ▼ 6.871617 |

Nonce: 20 Nonce: 21

Overview

Balance: 7.876422560609006967 Ether

Ether Value: \$3,049.75 @ \$397.30174

Token:

More Info

My Name Tag: Not Available, login to update

Transactions ERC20 Token Txns Loans Analytics Comments

12 Latest 12 from a total of 12 transactions

| Txn Hash | Block | Age | From | To | Value | [Txn Fee] |
|---|----------|-------------------|--|--|------------------|----------------|
| 0x897ca958872ed3d... | 11146179 | 1 min ago | 0x3c79295ceaac223fe... | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 6.87 Ether | 0.001817 |
| 0x9851939d013420115... | 11146119 | 12 mins ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x52041ace9554ac89... | 0 Ether | 0.000191250079 |
| 0x7264112161776300... | 11146111 | 14 mins ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x3d0d0d71218a8c3... | 1.05 Ether | 0.00081400003 |
| 0x70a032a04cd42a7a... | 11146026 | 34 mins ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x52041ace9554ac89... | 0 Ether | 0.000811680079 |
| 0x604daa41e59f84... | 11146018 | 35 mins ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x2856121d1e3e4e3f... | 1.05 Ether | 0.00080300003 |
| 0x8181263402c79894a6... | 11117274 | 4 days 10 hrs ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x52041ace9554ac89... | 0 Ether | 0.001140000079 |
| 0x033c6d4e61b79c96... | 11117263 | 4 days 10 hrs ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x2009918eab32e72... | 1.05 Ether | 0.00044100003 |
| 0x443326c0a85046024... | 11117246 | 4 days 10 hrs ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x3e0d7130c120b4... | 5 Ether | 0.00020100003 |
| 0x3a4863c022c09a25... | 11116663 | 4 days 12 hrs ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x5670984355a70bc... | 1.15 Ether | 0.00037000003 |
| 0x0a609e17e4e8911c... | 11104115 | 6 days 10 hrs ago | 0x86852bc12295406a... | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 10.2520728 Ether | 0.001134 |
| 0x0a4f8664c56a0937... | 11104062 | 6 days 11 hrs ago | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 0x52041ace9554ac89... | 1 Ether | 0.019871387 |
| 0x1032a1a82415b2... | 11104034 | 6 days 11 hrs ago | Binance | 0x11cd7173aa0a46037... | 1.095 Ether | 0.0126 |

Weak Pseudonymity:


- Account public
- Values public
- Mostly one account per user
- Some accounts known (Binance)

Privacy in Bitcoin

Summary

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| Size | 1110 (bytes) |
| Fee Rate | 0.0016173243243243244 BTC per kB |
| Received Time | Apr 10, 2017 12:38:00 AM |
| Mined Time | Apr 10, 2017 12:38:00 AM |
| Included in Block | 00000000000000001f0115cca585646832b337404032c88539ce2995e799e5c |

Details

[c2561b292ed4878bb28478a8cafd1f99a01faeb9c5a906715fa595cac0e8d1d8](#)  mined Apr 10, 2017 12:38:00 AM


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 16k4365RzdeCPKGwJDNNBEkXj696MbChwx 0.53333328 BTC | ➔ | 1JgVBpw5TDMTRoZXg9XpPDQRRHtNb5CsPA 0.01031593 BTC (U) |
| 1Bsh4KD9ZJT4dJcoo7S5uS1jvtmtVmREb7 1.47877788 BTC | | 1AFLhD4EtG2uZmFxmfdXCyGUNqCqD5887u 2 BTC (S) |

FEE: 0.00179523 BTC

1 CONFIRMATIONS 2.01031593 BTC

Privacy in Bitcoin

Alice can have many addresses (creating address is free)



Linking Addresses to Identities

Ins: A1: 4 A2: 5 out: B: 6, A3: 3

- Buying book from merchant
 - Alice learns one of merchant's addresses (B)
 - Merchant learns three of Alice's addresses
- Alice uses an exchange BTC \leftrightarrow \$
 - KYC (Know your customer)
 - Money serving business collect and verify IDs

Linking Addresses to Identities

Ins: A1: 4 A2: 5 out: B: 6, A3: 3

- Buying book from merchant
 - Alice learns one of merchant's addresses (B)
 - Merchant learns three of Alice's addresses
- Alice uses an exchange BTC \leftrightarrow \$
 - KYC (Know your customer)
 - Money serving business collect and verify IDs
 - Exchange learns real ID

Donating to Wikileaks

| | | | | |
|--|--------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 35cebb3fccb87014576cdc812a795149219bcc841add3bd5fde7df4ed6cfc86a | 118 Satoshis/vByte | 0.00039648 BTC | 643,240 | 2020-08-11 18:55:42 |
| 3KRN5kFK5CquqvXQ5X8A9Tz8Ek7GRdYgpM | 0.01651783 | WikiLeaks | 3KRN5kFK5CquqvXQ5X8A9Tz8Ek7GRdYgpM | 0.00010000 0.01602135 |
| | | + 0.00010000 | 11,325 Confirmations | |
| ed0a9b313673147e54e60f586e954866698d7d57172900e147c71dd6430d7a99 | 21 Satoshis/vByte | 0.00004663 BTC | 638,139 | 2020-07-07 13:49:18 |
| WikiLeaks | 0.00359357 | 33wNiuKXJAj85e4yXJxJVWtsKqWdsDFK4 | 0.00354694 | |

Bitcoin

Wikileaks

Bitcoin is a secure and anonymous digital currency. Bitcoins cannot be easily tracked back to you, and are safer and faster alternative to other donation methods. You can send BTC to the following address:

1HB5XMLmzFVj8ALj6mfBsbifRoD4miY36v

Various sites offer a service to exchange other currency to/from Bitcoins. There are also services allowing trades of goods for Bitcoins. Bitcoins are not subject to central regulations and are still gaining value. To learn more about Bitcoins, visit the website (<https://bitcoin.org>) or read more on [Wikipedia](#).

For a more private transaction, you can click on the refresh button above to generate a new address



Wikileaks had one address -> Easy to see who donates

Is Bitcoin Anonymous?


No!

Now commercialized:


It is possible to:

- Link all addresses of a single entity:
 - Determine total assets
- Given two TX $A \rightarrow B$, $C \rightarrow D$, Are B&C the same
 - If D knows C, can unmask B
 - Trace stolen funds, find tax evasion
 - Oppressive governments (Venezuela, North Korea)
- Test if Alice ever paid Bob (Wikileaks)

Often answer is yes for all 3. How?




Network Anonymity



Light client network anonymity


SPV client



Full node



All addresses and transactions



Fully linkable!

Idioms of use

Heuristic 1:

Two addresses are input to same TX (and not multisig script)
-> both addresses are controlled by same entity

The screenshot displays a Bitcoin transaction interface. At the top, the transaction ID is `c2561b292ed4878bb28478a8cafd1f99a01faeb9c5a906715fa595cac0e8d1d8` and it was mined on Apr 10, 2017 at 12:38:00 AM. The transaction has two input addresses and two output addresses. The inputs are `16k4365RzdeCPKGwJDNNBEkXj696MbChwx` (0.53333328 BTC) and `1Bsh4KD9ZJT4dJcoo7S5uS1jvtmtVmREb7` (1.47877788 BTC). The outputs are `1JgVBpw5TDMTRoZXg9XpPDQRRHtNb5CsPA` (0.01031593 BTC (U)) and `1AFLhD4EtG2uZmFxmfdXCyGUNqCqD5887u` (2 BTC (S)). The fee is 0.00179523 BTC. The transaction has 1 confirmation and a total value of 2.01031593 BTC.

| Address | Amount (BTC) |
|---|----------------|
| <code>16k4365RzdeCPKGwJDNNBEkXj696MbChwx</code> | 0.53333328 |
| <code>1Bsh4KD9ZJT4dJcoo7S5uS1jvtmtVmREb7</code> | 1.47877788 |
| <code>1JgVBpw5TDMTRoZXg9XpPDQRRHtNb5CsPA</code> | 0.01031593 (U) |
| <code>1AFLhD4EtG2uZmFxmfdXCyGUNqCqD5887u</code> | 2 (S) |

FEE: 0.00179523 BTC

1 CONFIRMATIONS

2.01031593 BTC

Idioms of use

Heuristic 2:

Change address is controlled by same user as input address

Which is change address: Used to be first address

Heuristic: Only new address, Non round, Less than inputs

The screenshot displays a Bitcoin transaction interface. At the top, the transaction ID is `c2561b292ed4878bb28478a8cafd1f99a01faeb9c5a906715fa595cac0e8d1d8` and it was mined on Apr 10, 2017 at 12:38:00 AM. The transaction has two inputs and two outputs. The first input is `16k4365RzdeCPKGwJDNNBEkXj696MbChwx` with a value of 0.53333328 BTC. The second input is `1Bsh4KD9ZJT4dJcoo7S5uS1jvtmtVmREb7` with a value of 1.47877788 BTC. The first output is `1JgVBpw5TDMTRoZXg9XpPDQRRHtNb5CsPA` with a value of 0.01031593 BTC (U). The second output is `1AFLhD4EtG2uZmFxmfdXCyGUNqCqD5887u` with a value of 2 BTC (S). The fee is 0.00179523 BTC. The transaction has 1 confirmation and a total value of 2.01031593 BTC.


| Address | Value (BTC) |
|---|----------------|
| <code>16k4365RzdeCPKGwJDNNBEkXj696MbChwx</code> | 0.53333328 |
| <code>1Bsh4KD9ZJT4dJcoo7S5uS1jvtmtVmREb7</code> | 1.47877788 |
| <code>1JgVBpw5TDMTRoZXg9XpPDQRRHtNb5CsPA</code> | 0.01031593 (U) |
| <code>1AFLhD4EtG2uZmFxmfdXCyGUNqCqD5887u</code> | 2 (S) |

FEE: 0.00179523 BTC

1 CONFIRMATIONS

2.01031593 BTC

Example tracing



Coinbase knows entity!

Experiment (2013)

- Use Heuristic 1 and 2 -> 3.3M clusters
- ID 1070 addresses by interacting with merchants
 - Coinbase, Bitpay, ...
- Learn ID of 2200 clusters
 - 1.8M address
 - 15% of total value
 - Track multiple thefts
 - Learn total assets for each cluster




Figure 6: A visualization of the user network. The area of the cluster represents the external income value: i.e. the bitcoins received from

Making Cryptocurrencies anonymous




Mixing



Anonymous cryptocurrencies

Another example





Ins: A1: 1. out: EC1 1

Ins: EC1: 1 out: S: 0.8, EC2: 0.2

Alice and Subcontractor learn EC's profit margin.
How can we prevent this?

Another example



Ins: A1: 1. out: EC1 1

Ins: EC1: 1 out: S: 0.8, EC2: 0.2


EC has many customers. Mix payments -> use some to pay sub

Mixing

A1 -> M: 1

B1 -> M: 1

C1 -> M: 1



Ins: M: 3 Outs: B2: 1, A2: 1, C2: 1

Mixing Analysis

- Outside observer who is A_2 ?
 - $A_2 \in \{Alice, Bob, Carol\}$
- For Bob
 - $A_2 \in \{Alice, \cancel{Bob}, Carol\}$
- The more the better mixing

Mixer Problems

- Mixer can deanonymize
- All outputs MUST have same value
 - If not you can match inputs and outputs
- Mixer takes transaction fees
- Mixer can steal funds
- ScriptPK for all outputs must be the same
 - Otherwise linkable on spend

CoinJoin (Mixing without Mixer)

CoinJoin TX

Ins: :A1: 5, B1: 3, C1: 2

Outs: B2: 2, A2: 2, C2: 2


Change (not private): A3: 3, B3: 1

Signed: Multisig A1, B1, C1

Out value = min of inputs

Usually ~40 inputs

CoinJoin



A1: 5, A3 (change)



A2 (over Tor)



Add Signatures



Publish Transaction

Online Forum



A1: 5, A3

B1: 3, B3

C1: 2, C3

B2, A2, C2

What if A1 is spent?


Coinjoin drawbacks

Coinjoin still has drawbacks:

- Interaction required
- Any party can disrupt the process
- Anonymity set determined by who is using the service
- Transaction amounts public

Cryptonote (Monero)

- Cryptonote protocol, proposed in 2012
- Enables non interactive coinjoin
- Sender can choose anonymity set
- Hides amounts
- Basis of Monero, Mobile coin, others



Recap Signatures

Def: a signature scheme is a triple of algorithms:

- **Gen()**: outputs a key pair (pk, sk)
- **Sign**(sk, msg) outputs sig. σ
- **Verify**(pk, msg, σ) outputs 'accept' or 'reject'

Secure signatures: (informal)

Adversary who sees signatures on many messages of his choice, cannot forge a signature on a new message.

Linkable Ring Signatures

Def: a signature scheme is a triple of algorithms:

- **Gen()**: outputs a key pair (pk, sk)
- **RingSign**(sk, PKs, msg) outputs sig. σ
- **Verify**(pk, PKs, msg, σ) outputs 'accept' or 'reject'
- **Link**($PKs, msg, \sigma, PKs', msg', \sigma'$) outputs 0 or 1

$$PKs = \{pk_1, pk_2, \dots, pk_n\}$$
$$pk \in PKs$$

Secure signatures: (informal)

Unforgeability: Adversary who sees signatures on many messages of his choice, cannot forge a signature on a new message.

Anonymity: $\mathbf{Sign}(sk_i, PKs, msg) \approx \mathbf{Sign}(sk_j, PKs, msg)$ for $pk_i, pk_j \in PKs$


Linkability: If a secret key signs two messages, then the signatures can be linked

CryptoNote

All UTXOs



PKs subset of UTXOs



Fresh PK_R



TX: Inputs PKs , Output: PK_R , Signature: $Sign(sk, PKs, TX)$

CryptoNote analysis

- Sender picks anonymity set
 - Ring signature provides anonymity in set
 - The larger the set the better
 - Still not perfect (e.g. if I know all other PKs in set)
- Linkability of ring signatures prevents double spends
- Keys can only be used once
- Hides amounts (unlike coinjoin)
- Fully non interactive

END OF LECTURE

Next lecture:

Zero-knowledge SNARKs